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There is no dispute that women are grossly under-represented in the world's legislatures. However, there 
are several explanations for this under-representation and for the variation that exists between regions and 
between countries. The prevailing literature points to institutional, developmental, and cultural variables. 
This study uses the post-communist context in order to controlfor aspects ofculture and current altitudes 
associated with the legacy ofcommunism. Given the common experience ofstate socialism and the re­
traditionalization ofsocial values associated with a backlash against directive emancipation, culture 
cannot be the mainfactor in determining the wide variation in levels offemale legislative representation in 
the new democracies ofEast-Central Europe. In testing for both institutional variations and levels of 
modernity, this study suggests that socioeconomic development explains variation across the region while 
institutions explain variations within countries over time. Furthermore, low socioeconomic development 
may place a ceiling on the extent to which "woman-friendly" institutions can increase female 
representation. 
Introduction 
Women are under-represented in legislatures throughout the world. Only 13.9 
percent of all legislators are women (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2000). The presence of 
female faces does not, by itself, guarantee political equality. In the post-communist 
legislatures, the decrease in the number of female members since communism does not 
necessarily entail a decrease in women's political influence, because descriptive 
representation was achieved through the use of quotas in single candidate races (Wolchik, 
1998). Arguably, however, female parliamentarians are necessary to get women's issues 
on the agenda, and the absence of women in the decision making process has negative 
repercussions for the quality of democracy (Rueschemeyer, 1994; Matland and Taylor, 
1997; Zimmerman, 1994). Women in post-communist countries stand to lose substantial 
rights during the dual economic and democratic transitions (Einhorn, 1993). 
While no country in the world has achieved gender equity, Sweden is close with 
42.7 percent of the seats in the legislature held by women (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
2000). On the other end of the spectrum, advanced industrial nations, such as the United 
States, Ireland, France, and Japan, range from 7 to 13 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
2000). The post-communist cases generally fall into this lower category, declining from a 
communist era average of around 30 percent to levels as low as 3 to 5 percent in founding 
elections in Ukraine, Macedonia, and Albania. Several countries have seen the level of 
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female representation improve over the decade since democratization began. Croatia in 
2000 posted 20 percent female representation. The regional average, however, remains 
below the levels found in much of Western Europe. This raises a two-fold question: Why 
is there so much variation among post-communist countries; and what explains change 
over time within post-communist cases? 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Three Barriers to Female Representation 
According to the extant literature, the variation in female legislative 
representation can be explained by cultural, socioeconomic, and institutional variables 
(Kostova, 1998 and 1994; Matland, 1998; Norris and Inglehart, 2000; Reynolds, 1999; 
Kenworthy and Malawi, 1999). 
Political culture affects female representation in three ways: it affects whether or 
not women are willing to enter the political arena; it affects the degree to which women 
are willing to place pressure on party gatekeepers to recruit women and finally, it 
determines whether or not the electorate will support female candidates (Norris and 
Inglehart, 2000; Jaquette, 1997; Etzioni-Halevi and Illy, 1993). Norris and Inglehart find 
that culture, measured through responses to attitudinal survey questions, has a significant 
and independent affect on the recruitment ofwomen. Others have operationalized culture 
using socio-demographic proxies, such as female illiteracy rates, the ratio of the female 
work force compared to the male work force, and level of female education. These 
factors are expected to indicate the degree to which the prevailing political culture is 
egalitarian or traditional. 
Matland (1998) sees a more direct role for socioeconomic development or 
modernity. He argues that, without some basic level of socioeconomic development, 
women simply lack the cognitive and material resources necessary to mobilize. They 
must focus instead on issues of family survival. This contention is not without critics, 
however. Empirical research notes that high levels of socioeconomic development are 
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neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for high rates of female representation and 
institutional scholars emphasize that the "rules of the game" are gendered in crucial ways 
(Norris and Inglehart, 2000; Jaquette, 1997). 
The institutional argument usually focuses on the electoral system. In established 
democracies, electoral systems have been estimated to explain almost 30 percent of the 
variation in female representation (Norris and Inglehart, 2000). The literature generally 
supports the idea that proportional representation provides better opportunities for female 
candidates than single-member district plurality (Norris and Inglehart, 2000; Kostova, 
1998; Chowdhury and Nelson, 1994; Etzioni-Halevi and Illy, 1993; Jaquette, 1997; 
Zimmerman, 1994). Proportional representation benefits women because it encourages 
ticket balancing (Matland, 1998; Matland and Taylor, 1997). Parties can reach out to 
particular constituencies in a PR system without displacing powerful intra-party interests 
or taking the risk of "losing votes." In an SMD system, the "zero sum" nature of 
competition leads parties to choose safe, entrenched party interests who usually happen to 
be male. How much a PR system benefits female legislative representation depends on 
the district magnitude, the number of seats filled by a given constituency, and the party 
magnitude, the size of the delegation a party can expect to send to the legislature 
(Matland, 1998; Matland and Taylor, 1997). This, in turn, depends on the relevant 
number of parties in the system (Matland and Taylor, 1997). The greater the party 
magnitude, the more likely a party is to balance its ticket. Hence, electoral systems that 
reduce the number of parties through the use of thresholds ought to favor female 
candidates. 
There is growing acknowledgement that variables from the three approaches 
probably work together in complex ways. Socioeconomic development affects cultural 
norms; and institutions, while important, do not exist in a vacuum. Political and social 
pressures are necessary for institutions to produce high levels of female legislative 
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representation (Chowdhury and Nelson, 1994; Kenworthy and Malawi, 1999; Reynolds, 
1999). 
The Post-Communist Culture 
The "F" Word 
The post-conununist context is so interesting because it is widely agreed that post­
conununist women have rejected Western feminism (Wolchik, 1998; Matynia, 1994; 
Goldfarb, 1997; Funk, 1993; Meznaric and DIe, 1994). This conunon cultural "allergy" 
to feminism is a reaction to the conununist experience. In Eastern Europe, socialist 
regimes strongly encouraged women to participate in the public sphere, while 
downplaying their achievements in the private sphere (Einhorn, 1993). For women 
coming out of this communist experience, the tenets of Western feminism, such as 
emancipation and equality, are too close to the communist rhetoric (Jaquette and 
Wolchik, 1998; Funk, 1993; Fodor, 1994; Rueschemeyer, 1994). Additionally, there is a 
myth that Western feminists are spoiled man-haters who have the luxury of indulgence 
(Funk, 1993). This myth only serves to perpetuate the negative feelings toward Western 
feminism in post-conununist Europe. 
The Double Burden 
The state socialist models made full employment a priority. Women suddenly 
found themselves in positions outside ofthe private sphere. However, there was no 
movement for gender equity in the private sphere to parallel the movement for equality in 
the public sphere. Therefore, the new pressures of full-time occupations, and often 
several part-time jobs, combined with the old expectations of raising a family contributed 
to a heavy double burden (Regulska, 1994; Siemienska, 1998; Meznaric and DIe, 1994; 
Szalai, 1998). The communist parties also expected at least a minimum level of political 
participation, creating a triple burden (Einhorn, 1993; Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998). 
Women saw the transition as an opportunity to shed at least one of their burdens. 
Family duties cannot be shed and, for most, leaving work was not economically feasible. 
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Therefore, politics was the burden most easily and quickly shed (Rueschemeyer, 1994; 
Regulska, 1994; Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Einhorn, 1993). 
Return to Tradition 
The only perceived relief ofmost burdens is a return to homelife. There has been 
little consideration of men taking on more responsibility at home in order to ease the 
burden on women (Fodor, 1994). This is a direct result of the disproportionate 
emancipation of women in the public sphere, while ignoring the gender inequality in the 
private sphere. Women in East-Central Europe feel that the communist regimes 
"overemancipated" them (Siemienska, 1998; Matynia, 1994; Havelkova, 1993; Fodor, 
1994). In rejecting communism and its basic principles, such as secularism and gender 
equality, the traditional role of women as homemakers has resurged (Regulska, 1994; 
Funk, 1993; Siemienska, 1998 and 1999; Kostova, 1998; Einhorn, 1993). The rise of 
traditional values is linked with the rise ofnationalism in East-Central Europe since the 
fall of communism. Women are seen as the protectors of the nation against "dirty" 
politics and familial degradation (Einhorn, 1993; Siemienska, 1998). 
Women's Issues 
Women played an important role in the dissident movements and the transitions 
of the late 1980s, but their issues are emerging as secondary in the new democracies 
(Matynia, 1994). Essentially, the new governments see women's issues as a "luxury" that 
can wait until the economic and institutional problems of a dual transition are solved 
(Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Havelkova, 1993; Fischer and Hars{myi, 1994; Fodor, 
1994; Tarifa, 1994; Kostova, 1994; Einhorn, 1993). 
The relegation of women's issues to second status is part of the rejection of 
communism and Western feminism. Post-communist women are trying to differentiate 
themselves from the communist women's organizations and Western feminism (Matynia, 
1994). Fortunately, women are beginning to realize the limitations placed upon them 
both in the past and the present (Matynia, 1994). Now, it is even more important that 
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there are women in the parliaments of East-Central Europe, so that when women are 
ready to mobilize, they will have passionate advocates. 
Research Design and Methodology 
The main hypotheses of this study are (1) The more "woman-friendly" the 
electoral system, the higher the level of female representation and (2) The higher the level 
of socioeconomic development, the higher the level of female legislative representation. 
These hypotheses are tested in the post-communist countries of East-Central Europe. 
This allows for some control over current attitudes about traditional gender roles. The 
allergy to feminism, exit of women from political participation, return to tradition, and 
relegation of women's issues to lesser importance are all symptoms of the legacy of 
communism shared throughout the former communist bloc. Much of the former Soviet 
Union, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina are excluded from 
the analysis due to lack of available data. The unit of analysis is country election for all 
available post-communist elections in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Ukraine. This yields an N of43. 
The dependent variable of this study, female legislative representation, is 
measured through the percentage of females elected to the lower-house of parliament in 
each election, as reported by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
2000). The independent variables used to measure economic modernity in this study are 
GDP per capita (as an overall measure of affluence), agricultural versus service shares of 
GDP, and infant mortality rate (Putnam, 1993). Graphs 1 and 2 illustrate the variation in 
GDP per capita and infant mortality rates within the region. While the graphs depict the 
most recent data, later data analyses include statistics from each election year. These 
graphs are arranged from the highest levels of female representation in Croatia to lowest 
in Albania. 
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While GDP per capita may not be the most desirable measure of affluence, due to 
the volatility of the post-communist economies, it was the best measure available for all 
cases. The composition of GDP may be even more telling. Heavy and rapid 
industrialization was a core element of all communist centrally-planned economies. As a 
result, all of the countries in this study are industrialized; however, heavy "metal eating" 
industry is not profitable in the modem economy. The post-communist countries which 
have been able to overcome the rapid communist industrialization and move on to service 
industries are considered the more economically modem. With the collapse of 
agricultural productivity and the virtual abandonment of villages by the central 
government, there is evidence that rural areas in Eastern Europe are becoming 
increasingly backward. Therefore, countries with higher dependence on agriculture are 
less modem and less likely to recruit women. Graph 3 illustrates the vast difference in 
composition of GDP. As with GDP per capita and infant mortality rate, the most recent 
data is used for Graph 3, but data analyses include each election year. Again, the graph 
shows composition of GDP from highest female representation to lowest. 
All of the graphs discussed above are somewhat suggestive of trends. Graph I 
indicates a rough relationship between GDP per capita and female representation, but that 
relationship is by no means clear-cut. The expected patter, that female representation will 
increase with socioeconomic development, is more evident in Graph 2 and Graph 3. 
However, the possible relationship between female representation and socioeconomic 
development is a complex one and probably mitigated by other factors. This study will, 
therefore, test socioeconomic development against the remaining explanation: political 
institutions. 
[Insert Graph I, Graph 2, and Graph 3 about here] 
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The institutional independent variable, electoral system, will be operationalized 
through the number of relevant parties,l mean district magnitude, and a composite scale 
of "woman-friendliness." Fewer relevant parties should result in a higher party 
magnitude and more women getting into the legislature (Matland and Taylor, 1997). 
Both Poland and Ukraine have experienced sharp decreases in the number of relevant 
parties. The number of relevant parties in Ukraine dropped from 24.33 in 1994 to 9.91 in 
1998. In Poland, the number of relevant parties dropped from 8.3 in 1991 to 3.88 in 
1993. A higher mean district magnitude should also be more ''woman-friendly'' (Matland 
and Taylor, 1997). Several features of electoral system are captured in a rough scale of 0 
(SMD) to 3 (PR with threshold).2 The most woman-friendly is a PR system that reduces 
party fragmentation through use of a threshold. This measure does not take into account 
the size of threshold, size of legislature, or method of translating votes into seats - all 
factors that should affect female recruitment - but it provides a sense of the overall 
tendency of the electoral system. Figure 1 depicts which cases fall into each category. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Putting It All Together 
Using the measures discussed above, this study tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: GDP per capita and the percentage offemale legislators are 
positively correlated. 
Hypothesis 2: The percentage ofGDPfrom agriculture and the percentage of 
female legislators are negatively correlated. 
Hypothesis 3: The percentage ofGDPfrom services and the percentage offemale 
legislators are positively correlated. 
1 The number of relevant parties is obtained by squaring each party's percentage of seats and summing
 
across all parties. The number of relevant parties is the inverse of this sum (McGregor, 1993).
 
2 An SMD system was coded as "0," a mixed system as "1," a PR system without a threshold as "2," and a
 
PR system with a threshold as "3."
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Hypothesis 4: Infant mortality rate as an indicator ofdevelopment is negatively 
correlated with female representation. 
Hypothesis 5: The number ofrelevant parties and the percentage offemale 
legislators are negatively correlated. 
Hypothesis 6: High district magnitude and the percentage offemale legislators 
are positively correlated. 
Hypothesis 7: The more "woman-friendly" the electoral system, the higher the 
level offemale representation. 
Results 
Socioeconomic Variables 
Association between the socioeconomic variables and the percentage of females 
in parliament is tested using Pearson's correlation coefficients. All of the socioeconomic 
variables are statistically significant at the .01 level. Data analyses allow us to reject the 
null hypothesis ofno relationship between developmental factors and the percentage of 
female legislators. All of the relationships are in the expected direction, but the degree of 
post-industrialization (percent of GDP from services) displays the most robust 
relationship. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Institutional Variables 
Mean district magnitude) and electoral system are in the expected direction, 
statistically significant at the .01 level, and strongly correlated with the dependent 
variable. In systems with many relevant parties, fewer women make it into parliament. 
As with the other institutional variables, the relationship is in the expected direction, but 
it is neither strong nor statistically significant. This is not surprising given that the 
number of relevant parties changes dramatically in only a few cases. In countries that 
3 Correlation between mean district magnitude and the dependent variable was measured using Spearman's 
rho. All other institutional variables were measured with Pearson's correlation coefficients. 
10 
have seen a drastic reduction in the number of parties, e.g. Ukraine in 1998 and Poland in 
1993, there has been a significant increase in female representation. In the Polish case, 
the measures used in this study are probably not quite capturing the nuances of the 
changes in electoral system and the extent to which all features of an electoral system can 
work together to improve conditions for female recruitment (Gibson, 1999). As with the 
socioeconomic variables, the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Linear regression is used to measure socioeconomic variables and institutional 
variables against each other. Percentage of GDP from service and mean district 
magnitude are used in the model since they produce the most robust bivariate 
correlations. The adjusted R square is .407 and the significance for the model is .006. 
The standardized Beta coefficients, displayed in Table 4, are .509 for GDP from service 
and .502 for mean district magnitude. These two variables have roughly the same weight 
in this model. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
What Does This Mean? 
The results of this study certainly suggest that, when aspects of culture are 
controlled for, socioeconomic development and institutions affect female legislative 
representation. In countries with the lowest levels of socioeconomic development ­
Ukraine, Macedonia, and Albania - female representation is also lowest. In each of these 
countries, however, a change in institutions, namely the shift from SMD elections to 
hybrid rules including some element ofPR, resulted in a rough doubling of female 
representation. Table 5 illustrates the improvement in female representation due to 
electoral rules changes in these three countries. The regression model supports this. 
When socioeconomic development (measured through GDP from service) is held 
constant, mean district magnitude, as a proxy for institutions, helps women. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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Mat1and and Taylor (1997) argue that some minimum threshold of socioeconomic 
development must be achieved before institutions begin to matter. That contention is 
weakened by the significance of the institutional variables in this study. Of course, further 
research is needed. The existence of a pre-communist era feminist movement, religiosity 
and other indicators of "old culture," and the ideology of the party in power are all 
variables which could help explain the variation in female representation across the 
region. 
In this study, however, lower levels of socioeconomic development seem to place 
a ceiling on female representation. Institutions do matter, but they can only do so much. 
Albania, Macedonia, and Ukraine remain among the least representative of the countries 
in this study, despite electoral rules changes that doubled levels of female recruitment. 
The literature suggests that women in those countries lack the social and economic capital 
necessary to come forward as aspirants and place pressure on party gatekeepers to recruit 
and promote women (MatIand, 1998). Instead, they must focus on matters of family 
survival. It would seem, therefore, that any recipe to improve women's representation 
must include both favorable institutions and concrete measures to ensure family survival. 
Table I - Female Legislative Representation in Post-Communist Legislatures 
Case (country & % Case (country % 
election year) women & election year) women 
Albania 91 3.6 Moldova 94 4.8 
92 5.7 98 8.91 
97 5.16 Poland 89 13.5 
Bulgaria 90 8.5 91 9.6 
91 12.9 93 13 
94 13.3 97 13 
97 10.8 Romania 90 3.6 
Croatia 92 5.8 92 4.1 
95 7.87 96 7.3 
00 20.5 00 10.7 
Czech 96 IS Slovakia 94 14.7 
Republic 98 IS 98 14 
Estonia 92 13.7 Slovenia 92 14.4 
95 12.9 96 12.2 
99 17.82 00 12.2 
Hungary 90 7.3 Ukraine 94 3.8 
94 11.4 98 7.8 
98 8.29 
Lat ia 93 IS 
98 17 
Lithuania 92 7.1 
96 17.52 
00 10.64 
Macedonia 90 4.2 
94 3.3 
98 6.67 
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Figure I - Classification of electoral systems 
0 1 2 
-
3 
Albania 91 Albania 92 Poland 91 Bulgaria 91 
Macedonia 90 Albania 97 Romania 90 Bulgmia 94 
Macedonia 94 Bulgaria 90 Slovakia 98 Bulgaria 97 
Ukraine 94 Croatia 92 
Croatia 95 
Estonia 92 
Estonia 95 
Estonia 99 
Hungary 90 
Hungary 98 
Lithuania 92 
Slovenia 96 
Slovenia 00 
Croatia 00 
Czech Republic 96 
Czech Republic 98 
Latvia 93 
Moldova 94 
Moldova 98 
Poland 93 
Poland 97 
! Lithuania 96 
Lithuania 00 
Slovenia 92 
Macedonia 98 
Ukraine 98 
Romania 92 
Romania 96 
Romania 00 
Slovakia 94 
Table 2 - Correlation of socioeconomic variables with dependent variable 
Hypothesis Independent 
Variable 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Level of 
Significance 
HI GOP per 
Capita 
.508** .000 
H2 % of GOP 
from 
agriculture 
-.567** .002 
H3 % of GOP 
from service 
.638** .000 
H4 Infant 
mortality 
rate 
-.488** .000 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (I -tailed). 
Table 3 - Correlation of institutional variables with dependent variable 
Hypothesis Independent 
Variable 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Level of 
Significance 
Hs # of relevant 
parties 
-.084 .300 
H6 Mean district 
Magnitude 
.503** .005 
H7 Electoral 
system 
.457** .001 
----­
** Correlation is significant at the .0 I level (I-tailed). 
Table 4- Post-industrialism versus Electoral System: OLS Regression Model 
N Adjusted R 
Square 
Significance 
25 .407 .006 
Variable Standardized 
Beta Coefficient 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
T Significance 
GDP from 
Service 
.509 .209 2.795 .013 
Mean 
District 
magnitude 
.502 .284 2.759 .014 
Table 5 - Drastic changes in female representation due to changes in electoral rules 
Country % women 
before electoral 
change 
% women after 
electoral 
change 
improvement 
Albania 3.6 5.7 2.1 
Macedonia 
-
3.3 6.67 3.4 
Ukraine 3.8 7.78 4.0 
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